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The Appropriate Standard: Disparate Impact Under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
INTRODUCTION
As a wave of disabled soldiers returned from European
battlegrounds after World War I, Congress first enacted legisla-
tion aimed at rehabilitating the handicapped.' Although Con-
gress continued to make important strides toward providing
improved education, counseling, training, and other assistance
to individuals with physical or mental disabilities, 2 it was slow
to enact legislation protecting the civil rights of disabled
persons.
Congress finally took action to protect the handicapped
from discriminatory treatment with the passage of the Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973.3 The heart of the Act, section 504, forbids
federally assisted programs from excluding, denying benefits
to, or discriminating against "otherwise qualified" handicapped
individuals.4 Section 504 was first proposed as an amendment
1. Bills designed to rehabilitate disabled soldiers were introduced in 1917
and 1918. Congress subsequently extended the program to the industrially dis-
abled with the passage of the Smith-Fess Act, ch. 219, 41 Stat. 735 (1920) (re-
pealed 1973). This Act offered the physically handicapped limited training,
counseling, and placement services. See S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7,
reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076, 2082. With the passage in
1935 of the Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), which authorized annual appropriations, id.
§ 1001, 49 Stat. at 620 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1382 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)), the program undertaken in the Smith-Fess Act became more
permanent.
2. Congress amended the Smith-Fess Act in 1943, significantly changing
the concept of rehabilitation and extending the program to include the men-
tally ill and mentally retarded. See Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments
of 1943, ch. 190, 57 Stat. 374 (repealed 1973). Subsequent amendments in-
creased the amount of aid available, the scope of the available assistance, and
the target population eligible for such aid. See Vocational Rehabilitation
Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-391, 82 Stat. 297 (repealed 1973); Vocational
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-333, 79 Stat. 1282 (re-
pealed 1973); Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments of 1954, ch. 655, 68 Stat.
652 (repealed 1973).
3. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-
794 (1982)).
4. Id. § 504, 87 Stat. at 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)).
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to title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,5 which proscribes dis-
crimination based on race, color, or national origin by any pro-
gram receiving federal financial assistance.6 As a result,
section 504 closely resembles title VI.7
Despite the similarity between the two statutes, courts
have reached opposite conclusions regarding the applicability
of the disparate impact theory,8 which is permitted under title
VI, to actions brought under section 504.9 In Joyner v. Dump-
son,10 the Second Circuit followed the Tenth Circuit in re-
jecting the disparate impact theory in section 504 litigation; in
5. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
to 2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). The Rehabilitation Act was first proposed as
an amendment to title VI by Representative Charles Vanik of Ohio, 117 CONG.
REc. 45,945 (1971), and Senators Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and Charles
Percy of Illinois, 118 CONG. REc. 525 (1972).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
7. "Section 504 was patterned after, and is almost identical to, the antidis-
crimination language of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
2000d-1 . . . ." S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6390. Section 504 provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason
of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States
Postal Service. The head of each such agency shall promulgate such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the amendments to this
section made by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and De-
velopmental Disabilities Act of 1978. Copies of any proposed regulation
shall be submitted to appropriate authorizing committees of the Con-
gress, and such regulation may take effect no earlier than the thirtieth
day after the date on which such regulation is so submitted to such
committees.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
8. Under a disparate impact theory of recovery, a plaintiff need only es-
tablish that the alleged discrimination had a discriminatory effect; the plaintiff
is not required to prove discriminatory intent. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971), the seminal disparate impact case, the Supreme Court stated
that "[piractices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face cannot be main-
tained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employ-
ment practices." Id. at 430. The Court further noted that title VII "proscribes
not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in operation." Id. at 431.
9. Courts have allowed a disparate impact theory of recovery under § 504
in the following cases: Jennings v. Alexander, 715 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1983);
NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981); Lloyd v. Regional
Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Cit-
izens v. New Mexico, 495 F. Supp. 391 (D.N.M. 1980), rev'd and remanded on
other grounds, 678 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1982). Courts have rejected the theory in
the following cases: Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1983); Pushkin v.
Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
10. 712 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Jennings v. Alexander," the Sixth Circuit joined the Third Cir-
cuit in allowing the theory. The United States Supreme Court's
recent decision in Guardians Association v. Civil Service Com-
mission,12 in which the Court upheld the availability of the dis-
parate impact theory in a title VI context, provides an
important precedent with which to resolve this conflict among
the circuit courts. This Note contends that, given the close rela-
tionship between section 504 and title VI, Guardians strongly
supports the conclusion that a disparate impact theory should
be allowed under section 504.
Part I of this Note discusses the substantive content of the
Rehabilitation Act. Part II presents the approaches of the cir-
cuit courts to the question whether section 504 permits a dispa-
rate impact theory of recovery. Part III discusses the Supreme
Court's holding in Guardians. Finally, Part IV applies the
Guardians decision to the conflict noted above and concludes
that a disparate impact theory of recovery is now available
under section 504.
I. SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT:
SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT
The substantive content and legislative history of the Reha-
bilitation Act reveal that section 504 is the functional
equivalent of title VI in the handicap discrimination context.13
Although the legislative history of the Act is sparse,14 the Act
indicates that it was intended to "promote and expand employ-
ment opportunities in the public and private sectors for handi-
capped individuals and to place such individuals in
employment."' 5 The Act emphasizes the rehabilitation of indi-
viduals with severe handicaps and attempts to provide target
populations with a greater opportunity to participate fully in
society.16 Congress anticipated that seven million Americans
11. 715 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1983).
12. 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
13. See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
14. See Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1285 (7th Cir. 1977).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (1982).
16. The key to the intent of the bill is the Committee's belief that the
basic vocational rehabilitation program must not only continue to serve
more individuals, but must place more emphasis on rehabilitating indi-
viduals with more severe handicaps. It is the bill's intent to be more
responsive to the needs of the handicapped individual by providing a
better basic program of service as well as an emphasis within special
project authority for target populations whose needs are not now being
met within the basic program. Additionally, the committee has added
provisions designed to focus research and training activities on making
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would benefit from the rehabilitation services provided under
the Act.17
Section 504, the key antidiscrimination provision of the Act,
provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as
defined by section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance .... 18
The Act also contains important provisions aimed solely at dis-
crimination against the handicapped in employment. Section
501 proscribes such discrimination by the federal government,19
and section 503 extends the prohibition to businesses that
enter into certain types of contracts with the federal govern-
ment or that subcontract with federal contractors.20 Section
504, unlike sections 501 and 503, is not limited to the employ-
ment context.
To bring suit under section 504, an individual must come
within the statutory definitions of "handicapped" and "other-
wise qualified." 2' The Act defines a handicapped individual as
employment and participation in society more feasible for handicapped
individuals.
S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2076, 2092.
17. Id., 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 2091.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
19. Id. § 791.
20. Id. § 793.
21. Id. § 794. Every federal court that has considered the issue has held
that a private cause of action is available under § 504. E.g., Camenisch v. Uni-
versity of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 451 U.S. 390 (1981); see also infra note 34. The Supreme Court has im-
plicitly recognized a private cause of action under § 504. See Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984).
In Consolidated Rail Corp., the issue before the Court was whether § 504
incorporated the limitation contained in § 604 of title VI under which employ-
ment discrimination is actionable only when the "primary objective" of the fed-
eral financial assistance received by the employer is to provide employment.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976). The courts of appeals were split on this issue.
Some had held that this limitation was incorporated in § 504 by the 1978 amend-
ments to the Rehabilitation Act. See Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 677
F.2d 1271, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Cabrini Medical Center, 639 F.2d
908, 910 (2d Cir. 1981); Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672,
675 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980); Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation
Center, 590 F.2d 87, 89 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979). Other
courts had held that the complainant must establish that the program benefited
directly from the receipt of federal assistance, see Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760,
769 (5th Cir. 1981); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1232 (7th Cir.
1980), but need not demonstrate that the primary purpose of the assistance was
to provide employment, see Jones v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth.,
681 F.2d 1376, 1382 (5th Cir. 1981). In Consolidated Rail Corp., the Court re-
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"any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major
life activities, (ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is re-
garded as having such an impairment."22 In Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis,23 the Supreme Court defined an
"otherwise qualified" person as "one who is able to meet all of
a program's requirements in spite of his handicap."2 4 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that in interpreting
the "otherwise qualified" requirement "the proper focus ... is
... whether the requirements set forth by defendants... are
necessary and legitimate requirements of the job."25
The prohibitions contained in section 504 extend to any
"program or activity receiving federal financial assistance."26
Department of Health and Human Services regulations define
"recipient" to include states, public and private organizations,
and individuals.27 In addition, section 504 covers "any program
or activity conducted by an Executive agency or by the United
States Postal Service."28
solved this conflict, holding that § 504 does not incorporate the "primary objec-
tive" limitation. 104 S. Ct. at 1253-55. Although the defendant initially argued
that there is no private cause of action under § 504, it later abandoned this ar-
gument. Consequently, the Court stated that it was "unnecessary to address
the question here beyond noting that the courts below relied on Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), in holding that such a private right exists
under § 504." 104 S. Ct. at 1252 n.7.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (B) (1982). For precise definitions of the terms in the
definition of handicapped, see 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702 (1983); 41 C.F.R. § 60.741 app.
A (1981).
23. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). Respondent filed suit when she was denied admis-
sion to a nursing program conducted by petitioner on the basis of a serious
hearing disability. The Court held that respondent was not an "otherwise qual-
ified handicapped individual" within the meaning of § 504 and therefore the de-
cision to exclude her from the program was not discriminatory. Id at 413.
24. Id. at 406; see also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
25. Simon v. St. Louis County, Mo., 656 F.2d 316, 320 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
27. The Department of Health and Human Services defines recipient as
any state or its political subdivision, any instrumentality of a state or
its political subdivision, any public or private agency, institution, or-
ganization, or other entity, or any person to which Federal financial
assistance is extended directly or through another recipient, including
any successor, assignee, or transferee of a recipient, but excluding the
ultimate beneficiary of the assistance.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f) (1983).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Section 504 augments the coverage of § 501b.
See H.R. REP. No. 1780, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92-93, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7312, 7403-04. Thus, federal employers are potentially liable
for employment discrimination against the handicapped under either § 501 or
§ 504.
Although courts in various jurisdictions have yet to reach a consensus as to
1984] 1023
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
II. DISPARATE IMPACT AND SECTION 504 IN THE
COURTS
The federal courts of appeals have split on the question
whether section 504 permits a disparate impact theory of recov-
ery. The Second Circuit, in Joyner v. Dumpson,29 and the
Tenth Circuit, in Pushkin v. Regents of the University of Colo-
rado,30 have refused to allow plaintiffs to use a disparate im-
pact theory to prove violations of section 504. In contrast, the
Sixth Circuit, in Jennings v. Alexander,3 ' and the Third Circuit,
in NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc.,32 have allowed plaintiffs to
use a disparate impact theory of recovery. This conflict among
the proper relief for a violation of § 504, courts have granted injunctive relief.
See Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 451 U.S. 390 (1981); Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th
Cir. 1980); Baker v. Bell, 630 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1980). Since the Supreme
Court's decision in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397
(1979), however, the injunctive relief awarded plaintiffs under § 504 has been
considerably circumscribed. In Davis, the Court ruled that § 504 does not re-
quire recipients of federal financial assistance to take affirmative steps to ac-
commodate handicapped individuals. Id. at 407-12. In the wake of Davis,
courts may limit injunctive relief in cases of employment discrimination to
measures such as reinstatement and seniority rights. Courts are split with re-
spect to the availability of monetary damages under § 504. A majority of courts
have held that such relief is appropriate. See, e.g., Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d
969, 978 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 215 (1982); Gelman v. Department of
Educ., 544 F. Supp. 651, 653-54 (D. Colo. 1982); Hutchings v. Erie City & County
Library Bd. of Directors, 516 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Patton v.
Dumpson, 498 F. Supp. 933, 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of
Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 949 (D.N.J. 1980). But see Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Indep.
School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 474 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Boxall v. Sequoia Union
High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1979). In addition, a prevail-
ing party other than the United States may seek reasonable attorneys' fees
under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (1982). Finally, § 504 authorizes an agency to
terminate funding to programs that violate the Act. Id. § 794.
29. 712 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1983). Plaintiffs brought a class action suit on be-
half of approximately 5000 New York children challenging the constitutionality
of certain New York statutes that required parents who desired state-subsi-
dized residential care for their children to transfer temporary custody of the
children to the state. Plaintiffs alleged that the custody-transfer requirement,
on its face and as applied, violated their fourteenth amendment substantive
due process rights, title IV of the Social Security Act, and § 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973. Id. at 771-72.
30. 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
31. 715 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1983). Plaintiffs alleged that a variety of pro-
posed reductions designed to save Tennessee money on Medicaid expenditures
violated § 504. Such reductions included "deletion of certain drugs from the
Medicaid formulary, reductions in the level of reimbursement for health care
providers, reduction of inpatient hospitalization coverage, and reduction of out-
patient hospitalization services." Id. at 1038. By the time the case came to trial,
only the reduction in hospitalization coverage remained at issue. Id. at 1039.
32. 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981). Plaintiffs alleged that the proposed reloca-
tion of the Wilmington Medical Center from the inner-city to a suburb had an
adverse effect on the handicapped. Id. at 1325.
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the circuits stems from the courts' divergent conclusions con-
cerning the effect of variances between the language of title VI
and that of section 504, and from their contrary decisions with
respect to the validity of the interpretive regulations promul-
gated under section 504.
In concluding that plaintiffs may use a disparate impact
theory to establish violations of section 504, both the Third and
Sixth Circuits pointed to the close similarity between section
504 and title VI. Congress patterned the language33 and general
design34 of section 504 directly after title VI. Further, Congress
33. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) ("No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.") with 29 U.S.C. § 794(1982) ("No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as
defined by section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance. .. ").
34. Congress specifically and explicitly patterned § 504 after title VI:
Section 504 was patterned after, and is almost identical to, the an-
tidiscrimination language of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. 2000d-1 (relating to race, color, or national origin), and section
901 of the Education Amendments of 1972, 42 U.S.C. 1683 (relating to
sex). The section therefore constitutes the establishment of a broad
government policy that programs receiving Federal financial assistance
shall be operated without discrimination on the basis of handicap. It
does not specifically require the issuance of regulations or expressly
provide for enforcement procedures, but it is clearly mandatory in
form, and such regulations and enforcement are intended.
S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6373, 6390.
Congress also intended § 504 to be enforced in a manner similar to title VI:
The language of section 504, in followig [sic] the above-cited Acts,
further envisions the implementation of a compliance program which is
similar to those Acts, including promulgation of regulations providing
for investigation and review of recipients of Federal financial assist-
ance, attempts to bring non-complying recipients into voluntary com-
pliance through informal efforts such as negotiation, and the imposition
of sanctions against recipients who continue to discriminate against
otherwise qualified handicapped persons on the basis of handicap.
Such sanctions would include, where appropriate, the termination of
Federal financial assistance to the recipient or other means otherwise
authorized by law. Implementation of section 504 would also include
pre-grant analysis of recipients to ensure that Federal funds are not in-
itially provided to those who discriminate against handicapped individ-
uals. Such analysis would include pre-grant review procedures and a
requirement for assurances of compliance with section 504. This ap-
proach to implementation of section 504, which closely follows the mod-
els of the above-cited antidiscrimination provisions, would ensure
administrative due process (right to hearing, right to review), provide
for administrative consistency within the Federal government as well
as relative ease of implementation, and permit a judicial remedy
through a private action.
Id. at 40, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6390-91 (emphasis added).
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amended the Rehabilitation Act in 1978 to make "the remedies,
procedures, and rights set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964" available under section 504.35 In Jennings, the
Sixth Circuit noted that "[c]ourts have generally applied the
same tests of discrimination law to section 504 as are applied to
Title VI."36 The court went on to quote approvingly from Medi-
cal Center, Inc., in which the Third Circuit, after noting that
disparate impact analysis is permitted under title VI,37 con-
cluded that "[t]he Rehabilitation Act ... provide [s an] equally
strong [case] for application of an impact test since [it is] pat-
terned after Title VI. We therefore use the same standard."38
The Sixth Circuit also relied on regulations promulgated
under section 504 by the former Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare (HEW), which forbid the use of federal funds
in programs that have a discriminatory effect on the handi-
capped.39 The court stated that "[r] egulations by the enforcing
35. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabili-
ties Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 102(a), 92 Stat. 2955, 2983 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1982)).
36. 715 F.2d at 1041.
37. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983), there had been some controversy as to whether
the disparate impact standard upheld under title VI in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563 (1974), was overruled by the Court in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Guardians, the Court held that a disparate impact analy-
sis continues to be available under title VI. See infra text accompanying notes
59-77.
38. 657 F.2d at 1322; see also Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277
(7th Cir. 1977). In Lloyd, without specifically discussing whether a showing of
discriminatory effect establishes a violation of § 504, the Seventh Circuit held
that § 504 applied to a claim challenging the funding of certain public mass
transportation programs which had the effect of discriminating against the
physically disabled. The court stated:
Because of the near identity of language in Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 and Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Lau is
dispositive. Therefore, we hold that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, at least when considered with the regulations which now imple-
ment it, establishes affirmative rights and permits this action to
proceed.
Id. at 1281.
39. The regulations were not issued until nearly four years after the pas-
sage of the Rehabilitation Act. The delay resulted from difficulties in drafting
regulations to prohibit discrimination against the handicapped. See 41 Fed.
Reg. 29,547 (1976). HEW promulgated the regulations only after an executive
order and a court order were issued. President Ford directed HEW "to coordi-
nate the implementation of Section 504... by all Federal departments and
agencies... so that consistent policies, practices, and procedures are adopted
with respect to the enforcement of Section 504." Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3
C.F.R. 117 (1977). The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
issued an order in Cherry v. Matthews, 419 F. Supp. 922, 924 (D.D.C. 1976), di-
recting HEW to issue regulations implementing § 504 without further delay.
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agency are entitled to great weight."4 0 The HEW regulations
specifically prohibit recipients of federal funds from utilizing
"criteria or methods of administration... which have the effect
of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to discrimination
on the basis of handicap."41 Congress envisioned the promul-
gation of regulations implementing section 50442 and, indeed,
has since approved the HEW regulations. 4 3 Relying on these
regulations, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a showing of dis-
parate impact suffices to prove a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion under section 504.44
In contrast, the Second Circuit, in Joyner, and the Tenth
Circuit, in Pushkin, distinguished between discrimination
based on impermissible factors such as race, sex, or national
origin and discrimination based on handicap. Although it is im-
permissible to evaluate an individual based on race, sex, or na-
tional origin, it is permissible to take account of handicaps in
determining whether an individual is "otherwise qualified" for
a job or for participation in a federal program.45 Furthermore,
instances may arise where a handicap will render an "other-
wise qualified" individual less qualified than a nonhandicapped
individual.46 Thus, "a § 504 action frequently does not lend it-
self easily to the analysis used for allocation of burdens and or-
der of presentation of proof used in suits alleging
40. 715 F.2d at 1041 (citing Brennan v. Owensboro-Davis Co. Hosp., 523 F.2d
1013, 1028 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976)).
41. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b) (4) (i) (1983) (emphasis added). The regulations in-
dicate that the use of an "effects" standard under § 504 "is an application of the
principle established under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Griggs v.
Duke Power Company." 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 app. A, at 303 (1983); see supra note 8.
42. See supra note 34. Patterned directly after title VI, "the language of
section 504... envisions the implementation of a compliance program which is
similar to [title VI], including promulgation of regulations providing for investi-
gation and review of recipients of Federal financial assistance." S. REP. No.
1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373,
6390; see also supra text accompanying note 35, and notes 38-39.
43. See infra text accompanying note 104.
44. 715 F.2d at 1042.
45. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981); see also supra
text accompanying note 24; infra text accompanying note 90.
46. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 766 (2d Cir. 1981). In Doe, a medi-
cal student seeking readmission to medical school filed suit alleging she was
discriminated against in violation of § 504. The Second Circuit held that plain-
tiff was not entitled to a mandatory preliminary injunction because she had
failed to establish that in spite of her handicap she was as qualified as other
applicants who were admitted. Id. at 777. The court, however, denied the medi-
cal school's motion for summary judgment because it concluded that there was
a substantial factual issue on the merits of plaintiff's claim. The court did not
consider whether plaintiff could rely on a disparate impact theory to establish a
violation of § 504. Id. at 762.
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discrimination based on impermissible factors."47 In light of
these considerations, the Second and Tenth Circuits rejected
the importation of title VI theories, such as disparate impact,4 8
which are forged in the context of discrimination based on im-
permissible factors, to section 504 actions, in which a handicap
may constitute a permissible factor in the determination of
whether a candidate is qualified. 49
47. Id. at 776. The analysis used for allocating burdens and order of pres-
entation of proof in suits alleging discrimination based on impermissible fac-
tors was described by the Second Circuit in Doe as follows:
In such suits although the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant discrimi-
nated against him on the basis of an impermissible factor, he may es-
tablish a prima facie case by proving that he applied for a position for
which he was qualified and was rejected under circumstances indicat-
ing discrimination on the basis of an impermissible factor. The burden
then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination
by coming forward with evidence that the plaintiff was rejected for a
legitimate reason, whereupon the plaintiff must prove that the reason
was not true but a pretext for impermissible discrimination.
Id. at 776. This method of analysis was established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
In Doe, the Second Circuit maintained that because the analysis suggested
in McDonnell Douglas is phrased in terms of permissible versus impermissible
factors, it is inapplicable to claims brought under § 504, in which it is permissi-
ble to consider an individual's handicap in determining whether that individual
is "otherwise qualified." 666 F.2d at 776.
48. Although he concurred with the result in Joyner, Judge Mansfield con-
cluded that § 504 does permit a disparate impact analysis. 712 F.2d at 783.
Mansfield noted that disparate impact analysis "is now well established as a
method of enforcing anti-discrimination statutes." Id. (citing Dothard v. Rawl-
inson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power, Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1970); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 945 (1981)). Mansfield further noted that the Rehabilitation Act's failure to
mention a disparate impact standard "has no significance; no such mention is
found in Title VII or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act," statutes
which permit a disparate impact theory of recovery, 712 F.2d at 784. Finally,
Mansfield asserted that "[slection 504 is intended to be part of the general
corpus of discrimination law," id. (citing New York Ass'n for Retarded Chil-
dren v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 649 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979)), and that the Supreme Court
implicitly recognized a disparate impact theory under § 504 in Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
49. Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1983); Pushkin v. Re-
gents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1384-85 (10th Cir. 1981). In Joyner, the
Second Circuit asserted that, instead of relying on a discriminatory effects
standard, plaintiffs should have adhered to the four-prong Rehabilitation Act
analysis articulated in Doe. Under that analysis, "'plaintiff must prove (1) that
she is a "handicapped person" under the Act, (2) that she is "otherwise quali-
fied" for the position sought, (3) that she is being excluded from the position
solely by reason of her handicap, and (4) that the position exists as part of a
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."' Id. at 774 (quoting
Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1981)). The Second Circuit
concluded that the district court had erred by overlooking the third element in
the Doe test. Id. at 774.
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In Joyner, the Second Circuit also refused to give "inordi-
nate weight to regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act."50
The court noted that although agency regulations deserve con-
siderable deference, 'this Court will not interpret an agency
regulation to thwart a statutory mandate."5 ' Because the Act
precludes programs only from discriminating "solely" on the
basis of handicap52 and does not mention an "adverse disparate
impact" test, the court concluded that plaintiffs bringing suits
under section 504 cannot rely on such a test.53
III. GUARDIANS ASSOCIATION V. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,54 the
Supreme Court cast some doubt on the continued availability
of disparate impact analysis under title VI. In Lau v. Nichols,55
decided prior to Bakke, the Court indicated that discriminatory
effect alone is sufficient to establish a violation of title VI.56
Some courts held that Bakke overruled Lau and that a showing
of discriminatory effect alone would no longer establish a viola-
tion of title VI.57 Other courts continued to follow Lau.58 In
50. 712 F.2d at 774. Plaintiffs argued that because the regulations promul-
gated under § 504 outlaw discriminatory effects, plaintiffs were entitled to rely
on a disparate impact standard. See id. at 775; supra text accompanying note
41.
51. 712 F.2d at 775 (quoting Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Gee, 702 F.2d 411, 414
(2d Cir. 1983)).
52. Title VI, for example, prohibits exclusion, denial, or discrimination "on
the ground of" race, color, or national origin; § 504 prohibits similar acts or
omissions "solely by reason of' handicap. See supra note 23.
53. 712 F.2d at 775.
54. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
55. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
56. Id. at 569. In Lau, approximately 1800 non-English speaking Chinese
brought suit against officials of the San Francisco Unified School District alleg-
ing that school officials had an obligation to provide plaintiffs with equal educa-
tional opportunities. Id. at 564. Relying on legislatively mandated regulations
promulgated by HEW, the Court stated:
Discrimination is barred which has that effect even though no pur-
poseful design is present: a recipient "may not... utilize criteria or
methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individu-
als to discrimination" or have "the effect of defeating or substantially
impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect
individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin."
Id. at 568 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b) (2) (1974)). The Court concluded that the
San Francisco schools were effectively excluding Chinese speaking children
from meaningful access to public education in violation of title VI. Id. at 568-69.
57. Bakke involved a constitutional and statutory challenge to the affirma-
tive action plan implemented by the University of California at Davis Medical
School. Justice Powell, author of the plurality opinion, wrote that "Title VI
must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the
10291984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission,59 the
Supreme Court finally resolved this conflict. In a plurality
opinion, the Court concluded that a showing of disparate im-
pact is sufficient to establish a violation of title V160 but added
that, in the absence of a showing of intent to discriminate, "de-
claratory and limited injunctive relief should be the only avail-
able private remedies." 61 Given the close relationship and
similarities between title VI and section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act,62 the Guardians decision has important implications
for the resolution of the conflict among the circuits concerning
the availability of a disparate impact theory of recovery under
section 504.63
In Guardians, a group of black and Hispanic police officers
challenged tests used by the New York City Police Department
to make entry-level appointments.64 Although all of the plain-
tiffs successfully completed the examination, under the Depart-
ment's policy of making appointments in order of test score
rank, black and Hispanic officers were hired later than white of-
ficers. As a result, blacks and Hispanics accumulated less sen-
iority and related benefits than white officers. In addition, the
Department's last-hired, first-fired policy, under which officers
with lower test scores faced earlier layoffs, disproportionately
Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 438 U.S. at 287. Because
the Supreme Court has held that only intentional discrimination is illegal
under the Constitution, see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48
(1976), some courts interpreted Bakke as overruling Lau, see, e.g., Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 648 F.2d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128
(1981); Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1006 (5th Cir. 1981); Guardians Ass'n
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 633 F.2d 232, 264 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3221
(1983); Lona v. Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 248, 250 (2d Cir. 1980); Parent Ass'n v.
Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 717 (2d Cir. 1979); Harris v. White, 479 F. Supp. 996, 1002
(D. Mass. 1979).
58. NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1329 (3d Cir. 1981) (en
banc); Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d
1022, 1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 1978); Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 903 (E.D. Mo.
1979), affid on other grounds, 620 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. City of Ar-
cadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363, 1378 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
59. 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983). Pushkin, Joyner, and Medical Center, Inc. were
all decided before Guardians. Jennings was decided after Guardians, although
the decision in Jennings was released only approximately one month after the
Guardians decision.
60. Id. at 3223. The plurality consisted of Justices White, Marshall, Ste-
vens, Brennan, and Blackmun.
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
64. 103 S. Ct. at 3223. Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, violations of
their rights under titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id.
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affected blacks and Hispanics.6 5
In upholding plaintiffs' right to rely on a disparate impact
theory under title VI, the Supreme Court disagreed with the
Second Circuit's determination that subjective intent to dis-
criminate is essential to a title VI violation.66 Of those Justices
who upheld a disparate impact standard under title VI, only
Justice White asserted that the statute on its face outlaws dis-
criminatory effects. 67 Maintaining that the Lau effects stan-
dard6S had survived Bakke,69 Justice White argued that the
issue in Bakke was whether title VI forbids affirmative action, a
form of intentional discrimination, even though the Constitu-
tion permits it.70 He contended that the Court's holding in
Bakke that title VI does not prohibit affirmative action because
it is not prohibited by the Constitution did not compel the con-
clusion that title VI proscribes only intentional discrimination
because the Constitution proscribes only intentional
discrimination.7'
Five Justices, including Justice White, held that regardless
of whether title VI on its face allows a discriminatory effects
standard, the administrative regulations promulgated under the
statute provide a sufficient basis on which to uphold such a
standard. Justice Marshall observed that "every Cabinet de-
partment and about forty federal agencies" have adopted stan-
dards barring discriminatory effects under title VI72 and noted
65. Id.
66. Id. The district court held that although plaintiffs had not established
that the New York City Police Department acted with discriminatory intent,
the tests violated title VI because they had a disparate impact on minorities.
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 526, 538-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration in light
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). On remand, the district court
determined that, under Teamsters, plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief for
discrimination that occurred prior to March 24, 1972, the date on which title VII
became applicable to municipalities. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
466 F. Supp. 1273, 1280 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). With regard to plaintiffs' title VI claim,
the district court held that a showing of discriminatory effect is sufficient to es-
tablish a title VI violation and that plaintiffs were entitled to compensatory as
well as injunctive relief. Id. at 1287. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's title VII holding but reversed its title VI holding. The Second
Circuit concluded that Bakke overruled Lau and therefore proof of discrimina-
tory intent is essential to establish a violation of title VI. Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 270 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 1140
(1982).
67. 103 S. Ct. at 3225-26.
68. See supra note 56.
69. 103 S. Ct. at 3226.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 3241 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also noted that
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that Congress has never changed the administrative interpreta-
tion of title VI despite ample opportunity to do so. 7 3 Justice
Stevens noted that the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld
legislatively mandated administrative regulations that adopt a
discriminatory effects standard under title VI.4 Stevens con-
cluded that the regulations in question were enforceable78 be-
cause they were "reasonably related to the purposes of the
enabling legislation."76 Consequently, the plaintiffs' showing
that the defendant was making entry-level appointments to the
New York City Police Department in a manner that the had a
discriminatory impact on blacks and Hispanics was sufficient to
establish a violation of federal law.77
IV. GUARDIANS AND DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER
SECTION 504
The Supreme Court's decision in Guardians supports the
conclusion of the Sixth Circuit, in Jennings v. Alexander,78 and
since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress has enacted ten
civil rights statutes patterned after title VI, including the Rehabilitation Act,
none of which require proof of discriminatory intent. Id. at 3242.
73. Id. at 3241.
74. Id. at 3254 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, J.J., dissent-
ing) (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 479 (1980); Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563, 568, 571 (1974)).
75. Id. at 3255.
76. Id. at 3254 (quoting Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411
U.S. 356, 369 (1973)). Justice Stevens reasoned that an administrative regula-
tion should not be disregarded unless "it is plainly and palpably inconsistent
with law." Id. at 3255 (quoting Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 470 (1900)).
Stevens concluded that a regulation calling for a discriminatory effects stan-
dard is an appropriate means to implement the mandate of title VI. Id. at 3255.
77. Id. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Pow-
ell, however, concluded that Bakke overruled Lau and consequently that there
must be a showing of discriminatory intent to establish a violation of title VI.
Id. at 3236-38. Justice O'Connor also argued that because Bakke establishes
that only purposeful discrimination violates title VI, the administrative regula-
tions in question, which adopt an effects standard, go well beyond the purposes
of the statute and are therefore impermissible. Id. at 3238 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in the judgment).
Justice Powell rejected plaintiffs' claim on the ground that no implied pri-
vate cause of action exists under title VI. Id. at 3236 (Powell, J., joined by Bur-
ger, C.J., concurring in the judgment). Powell noted that whether a private
right of action should be implied depends on congressional intent. Id. He con-
cluded that Congress clearly indicated that it did not intend a private cause of
action under title VI by expressly providing for the termination of funding
through "a carefully constructed administrative procedure to ensure that such
withholding of funds is ordered only where appropriate." Id. But see supra
note 21.
78. 715 F.2d 1036, 1041-42 (6th Cir. 1983).
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the Third Circuit, in NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc.,79 that a
showing of disparate impact is sufficient to establish a violation
of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. As noted above, Con-
gress specifically patterned section 504 after title VI.8O The leg-
islative history of section 504 suggests that Congress intended
section 504 to be the functional equivalent of title VI in the
handicap discrimination context.8 1 Moreover, Congress in-
tended that administrative agencies implement both title VI
and section 504 by the promulgation of regulations. 82 The regu-
lations promulgated under section 504, like those promulgated
under title VI, call for the application of a discriminatory effects
standard.83 For these reasons, the Supreme Court's analysis in
Guardians should be extended to validate the disparate impact
standard prescribed by the regulations promulgated under sec-
tion 504.
Despite the similarities between section 504 and title VI,
differences do exist in the language of the two statutes. Section
504 forbids discrimination against any "otherwise qualified
handicapped individual ... solely by reason of his handicap."84
Title VI, on the other hand, provides only that "[n] o person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin be subjected to discrimination." 85 Thus, section 504 adds
the terms "otherwise qualified" and "solely" to the language of
title VI.
The two statutes seek to protect different types of classes
of individuals. Individuals identified as handicapped may share
more relevant characteristics than, for example, individuals be-
longing to a particular race. In addition, although race, color,
sex, and national origin are never permissible factors for distin-
guishing between individuals in employment or federal pro-
grams,86 an individual's handicap is a permissible factor in
determining whether that individual is "otherwise qualified"
within the meaning of section 504.87
These differences, however, do not justify the rejection of a
79. 657 F.2d 1322, 1331 (3d Cir. 1981).
80. See Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disa-
bilities Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 120(a), 92 Stat. 2955, 2983
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1982)); supra notes 33-34.
81. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 42.
83. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
86. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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disparate impact standard under section 504. The difference in
statutory language between title VI and section 504 results
from Congress's recognition that handicap, unlike race or sex,
may constitute a legitimate basis for exclusion.88 To come
within the protections of the Act, a handicapped individual
must be "otherwise qualified."89 The Supreme Court has
noted, however, that the "otherwise qualified" and "solely" pro-
visions in section 504 mean "only that mere possession of a
handicap is not a permissible ground for assuming an inability
to function in a particular context."9 0 If a handicapped individ-
ual has shown that he or she is "otherwise qualified" under
section 504, precluding that individual from relying on the dis-
parate impact standard serves no justifiable purpose. Even if a
handicapped plaintiff relying on a disparate impact standard
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination under section
504, the defendant still has the opportunity to demonstrate that
the plaintiff's handicap was a legitimate basis for exclusion.9 1
Moreover, the greater heterogeneity of the group of individ-
uals who might be characterized as handicapped does not jus-
tify disallowing a disparate impact test under section 504. The
passage of the Rehabilitation Act provided notice to programs
and activities that receive federal financial assistance that dis-
crimination against the handicapped violates federal law. The
Act 92 and administrative regulations promulgated thereunder 93
define handicap, and case law under the Act further refines
that definition.94
88. See Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir.
1981). The Tenth Circuit described this distinction as follows:
[Tihe issue is not merely whether the handicap played a prominent
part in [Dr. Pushkin's] rejection, as in cases dealing with alleged dis-
crimination on the basis of race .... The question is whether Dr.
Pushkin was qualified for admission to the residency program in spite
of his handicap, so that he was wrongfully rejected from the program
on the basis of that handicap, or whether Dr. Pushkin's handicap would
preclude him from carrying out the responsibilities involved in the
residency program and future patient care.
Id. at 1384-85.
89. See supra notes 21, 24-25, and accompanying text.
90. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1978).
91. See supra note 47.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (1982).
93. See supra note 22.
94. See, e.g., New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644,
649 (2d Cir. 1979) (carrying a potentially contagious disease); E.E. Black, Ltd. v.
Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii 1980) (congenital back problem), vacated
on other grounds, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1183 (D. Hawaii 1981); Doe v.
Colautti, 454 F. Supp. 621, 626 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (present or former mental ill-
ness), affd, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 796
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (former drug addiction); Drennan v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp.,
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Claims based on a disparate impact theory of recovery
have also succeeded under section 501 of the Act, which prohib-
its discrimination by the federal government in the hiring and
promotion of handicapped individuals.95 For example, in
Prewitt v. United States Postal Service,96 the Fifth Circuit per-
mitted a disparate impact analysis in an action brought under
section 501.97 The court quoted with approval Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations promul-
gated under section 501 which call for an "effects" test,98 and
explicitly applied the disparate impact analysis adopted by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power9 9 to plaintiffs handi-
cap discrimination claim.100 The use of disparate impact theory
under other sections of the Act demonstrates that the heteroge-
neity of handicapped individuals does not preclude the use of
disparate impact to prove violations of section 504.
The legislative history of section 504 strongly suggests that
discrimination based on handicap should be treated similarly
to discrimination based on race, color, sex, or national origin
under title VI. Congress patterned the language and enforce-
ment of section 504 directly after title VIlol and in 1978 specifi-
cally amended section 504 to incorporate "the remedies,
procedures, and rights set forth in title VT."102 It seems likely
that if Congress intended to disallow a disparate impact analy-
sis under section 504, it would have done so explicitly.
428 F. Supp. 809, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (epilepsy); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F.
Supp. 982, 989 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (blindness), aff'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977), ap-
peal dismissed, 614 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1982).
96. 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
97. Id. at 306-07. Plaintiff had limited mobility of his left arm and shoulder
as a result of gunshot wounds received while serving in Vietnam. Plaintiff al-
leged that the Postal Service had discriminated against him in denying his ap-
plication for a clerk/carrier position, which required heavy lifting. Id. at 297.
Plaintiff claimed he could perform the required tasks despite his disability. Id.
98. Id. at 306-07 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1613.705 (1981)).
99. 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see supra note 8.
100. Similarly, in Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the court
held that a showing of disparate impact is sufficient to establish a prima facie
violation of § 501. Id. at 925. In Bey, claimant sought reinstatement to a postal
clerk position following the completion of a two-year enlistment with the Navy.
The court concluded that claimant's hypertension was a handicap which pre-
vented him from performing his essential employment functions without en-
dangering his health and safety and that consequently the Postal Service's
denial of his request for reinstatement did not violate § 501. Id. at 927-28.
101. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
102. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabili-
ties Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 102(a), 92 Stat. 2955, 2983 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1982)).
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Like the regulations promulgated under title VI, the regula-
tions promulgated under section 504 specifically adopt a dispa-
rate impact standard.103 Significantly, during the hearings on
the 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, the Senate
Committee on Human Resources stated: "It is the committee's
understanding that the regulations promulgated by the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare with respect to proce-
dures, remedies, and rights under Section 504 conform with
those promulgated under title VI. Thus, this amendment codi-
fies existing practice as a specific statutory requirement." 0 4
In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission,105 a
majority of the Supreme Court gave deference to the regula-
tions adopted under title VI and reaffirmed that disparate im-
pact is sufficient to establish a violation of title VI.106 The
degree of deference the Court gave the administrative regula-
tions is evidenced by the willingness of five Justices to uphold
a disparate impact standard under title VI solely on the basis of
those regulations. Justices White, Marshall, Stevens, Brennan,
and Blackmun all agreed that the administrative regulations
promulgated under title VI provide an ample basis for holding
discriminatory effects illegal under title VI.107
Because the only substantively significant difference be-
tween title VI and section 504 is the nature of the protected
class, 08 the holding and reasoning of Guardians should be ex-
tended to actions arising under section 504. In light of the
Court's analysis in Guardians, proof of disparate impact should
be held sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion under section 504.
CONCLUSION
Section 504 must not be interpreted narrowly. The
Supreme Court has often stated that courts must accord civil
rights legislation "a sweep as broad as [its] language."' 0 9 Like
title VI, the language of section 504 "is majestic in its sweep."" 0
103. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
104. S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978).
105. 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
106. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
109. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969).
110. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978);
see also S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 1981) ("section 504, as [a]
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In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, the
Supreme Court indicated that the Third Circuit, in NAACP v.
Medical Center, Inc., and the Sixth Circuit, in Jennings v. Alex-
ander, correctly determined that section 504 does indeed per-
mit a disparate impact analysis. The restrictive approach to
section 504 taken by the Second Circuit, in Joyner v. Dumpson,
and the Tenth Circuit, in Pushkin v. Regents of the University of
Colorado, conflicts with the broad remedial purposes of the Re-
habilitation Act, the mandate of Congress, and the Supreme
Court's recent holding in Guardians, which indicate that great
deference should be accorded administrative regulations.
James S. Alexander
remedial statute, should be broadly applied and liberally construed"), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981).
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